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Abstract/Summary 
 Over the past few years, a large number of companies have entered the space sector. Their 
activities are based on the use of relatively inexpensive small satellites, which enable these 
companies to provide services equivalent to those of companies that traditionally serve 
government agencies or public sector industries. 
 These new entrants have started to conquer significant market shares to the detriment of 
existing operators, but their definitive position on the space industry market depends largely 
on the innovative character of their technologies.  
 It does not seem that small satellites can be considered a disruptive innovation. At least not 
in terms of the characteristics they currently offer.  
 On the other hand, the generalized use of small satellites could potentially lead to two 
equally plausible scenarios: the progressive obsolescence of existing operators' economic 
models could in time lead to their disappearance and trigger a speculative bubble that could 
cause more damage than the one observed during the course of the 1990s. 
 
1. Introduction. Over the past three decades, several new companies have entered the space 
industry market. Space industry observers generally note the success of the American launch 
operator SpaceX, which threatens Arianespace's near global monopoly, pushing the European 
operator - and the States that support it - to precipitate finalizing the new Ariane6 launcher. But 
since the start of the new century, several important operators have been created in the wake of 
SpaceX.  
The main operators are as follows: 
- on the American side there are operators Skybox Imaging, created in 2009, in which Google 
has just invested; Planet Labs, created in 2010 and which was initially known as Cosmogia 
Inc.; NovaWurks, highly active since 2012; OmniEarth and UrtheCast, both created in 2014; 
GeoOptics, Garvey Spacecraft Corp. and Silicon Labs, created a few years earlier; 
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- on the European side are operators NovaNano; Clyde Space; Gomspace; Deimos Space; 
Dauria Aerospace; Virgin Galactic and Swiss Space System, better known under the acronym 
"S3". 
These new operators indicate that the space industry market remains heavily dominated by:  
- state monopolies, in terms of their national and international agencies, as well as national 
and international industries, both from the civil and military sectors;  
- publicly financed long-term projects, i.e., highly dependent on political decisions; 
- engineers' conservative approach, who remain highly aware of the risk of failure (launch, 
entry into orbit, breakdowns, de-orbiting) and therefore tend to avoid innovation; 
- the generalized extreme confidentiality in terms of program deployment, referring to 
"defense secret" when it is a question of military programs; 
- heavy and highly sophisticated satellites, capable of exceptional performance for a relatively 
long lifecycle (15 years). However, all, or nearly all, of the entrant operators listed above are 
characterized by the use of very light and small satellites with a limited performance. 
 
 
 
 
Small Satellite Class Mass Range 
Mini-satellite 100-500 kg 
Microsatellite 10-100 kg 
Nanosatellite 1-10 kg 
Picosatellite 0.01-1 kg 
Femtosatellite 0.001-0.01 kg 
 
Figure 1. Small Satellite Class 
These are small and sometimes minuscule satellites that they design, launch into orbit, and use in 
order to provide their services (Figure 1). However, in spite of their small size, many of these 
satellites already provide relatively sophisticated services, which point to increasingly significant 
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capacities available in the future, thanks to the progress that can be anticipated in the field. They are 
already sufficient for a number of civil and military uses. 
This trend, which began in the early 1990s, seems destined to continue: for SpaceWorks, the number 
of currently operational small satellites grew by 37.2% from 2009 to 2013, and should grow by 23.8% 
over the course of the next six years (2014 to 2020). 
This expected growth can be predominantly explained by the development of a veritable market of 
space applications dominated by the "big data" market that is itself a significant factor contributing 
to the decrease in price for services rendered and therefore overall costs also. 
Are these new entrants to the space industry, which is currently experiencing significant 
transformation, likely to call into question the current hierarchy of existing operators? Can satellite 
miniaturization be considered a disruptive innovation that is capable of provoking this calling into 
questionsuch possibility? And when it isn't a question of disruptive innovation, can satellite 
miniaturization have other consequences, such as the obsolescence of current technologies and 
their economic models, which could push aside existing operators and provoke a speculative 
phenomenon that could prove as devastating for the sector as the one observed in the 1990s?  
This paper responds to these questions, using a methodology founded on a qualitative analysis 
conducted from April until September 2014. 
2. Review of specialized literature and updating a conceptual model. The study required a 
systematic review of the specialized literature (see the bibliography below), with a view of building a 
conceptual model, making it possible to answer the questions above. 
According to the traditional approach, which is dominated by the Porter Mmodel (Figure 2), the level 
of competition in a given market is the result of four convergent forces: 
- the threat exercised by new entrants; 
- the development of substitute products; 
- suppliers' negotiation powers;  
- customers' negotiation powers. 
 
Figure 2. Porter’s Five Forces 
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competing 
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The more an operator dominates its product market (goods or services), and the less prevalent the 
threat of new entrants or product substitutes, the more the operator exercises market power in 
relation to its suppliers and clients. 
How is it that within a given market that is dominated by companies whose CEOs are intelligent and 
competent men and women who are highly experienced in management subtleties, who invest in 
research in order to improve the quality of their products and remain a step ahead of their 
customers' needs, who supervise their competitors and permanently adapt their strategies to their 
initiatives, a new entrant operator, often with limited means, can introduce him/herself, displace the 
current operators, and sometimes even eliminate them from the market in question? 
 
Clayton Christensen2 has shown that it is a question of what he suggests naming "the innovator's 
dilemma". Existing companies function according to traditional management principles: they 
improve their product, respond to consumer needs, and monitor their competitors. Their objective 
is always to conquer more of the market share and therefore to grow bigger and better.  
 
In doing so, they neglect what is happening beneath them: current consumers are tiring of their 
products, or potential consumers are discouraged from being able to afford them. They are 
therefore highly vulnerable to an entrant who will have perfected a disruptive innovation, who will 
carry the entire market and progressively marginalize them. 
 
An innovation is considered disruptive when a new technology disrupts the status quo: it makes it 
possible to create a new market and value network by displacing an existing technology or 
introducing an entirely new concept, as described in Figure 3. 
Disruptive technologies may destroy existing markets and create their own markets; they can be 
envisaged as a part of the destructive creation process which underpins global economic cycles, 
according to the economist Joseph Schumpeter’s theory.  
Disruptive innovations have to be distinguished from sustaining innovations, as explained by 
Christensen. Sustaining technologies are technologies that improve product performance. These are 
technologies that most large companies are familiar with; technologies that involve improving a 
product that has an established role in the market. Most large companies are adept at turning 
sustaining technology challenges into achievements. Christensen claims that large companies have 
problems dealing with disruptive technologies.  
Disruptive technologies, however, eventually surpass sustaining technologies in satisfying market 
demand with lower costs. 
                                                             
2
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Figure 3. Disruptive Innovation 
 
The first characteristic of a disruptive innovation is that it initially provides inferior performance to 
existing products available. As a result, it is usually not of much interest to existing users or 
customers. Disruptive innovations do not meet existing customers’ needs as well as currently 
available products’ or services’ needs. They may lack certain features or capabilities of the 
established goods.  
The second characteristic of a disruptive innovation is that it is adopted by a market that is currently 
underserved or not served at all. In other words, it serves a market segment that did not exist 
before.  
The third is that the new product is sold at a very low price compared to the existing product. 
The disruptive innovation product starts as a low-quality differentiated product in a low-volume 
marginal segment of a much larger mature market, which demands attributes that the mainstream 
market does not, and which is willing to give up some performance attributes. As a result, it is 
usually not of much interest to existing users or customers. In other words, Christensen’s disruptive 
technology is initially simpler, cheaper, and less performing.  
Several examples can be given in widely differing sectors, whether it is a question of mechanical 
construction (GM), steelwork (U.S. Steel) or IT (IBM) and telecommunications (France 
Telecom/Orange).  
 
However, this situation has worsened with the development of financial capitalism (investment 
funds). Large companies have become excessively focused on the financial and logical rationale. 
They either fail to innovate sufficiently or do so badly.  
 
To summarize, there are three main phases in the development of a new product (goods or 
services): 
- Phase 1 corresponds to perfecting an invention: (i). this consumes a great deal of capital in 
terms of research, studies and development; (ii). it creates jobs (iii). it makes it possible to 
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put new products or services onto the market that break with existing products and 
generate strong profitability. 
- Phase 2 corresponds to consolidating the invention: (i). capital expenditure is very low; (ii). 
very weak job creation; (iii). transition from innovation to improvement. 
- Phase 3 corresponds to perfecting efficiency, innovation and productivity gains (i). the 
product is no longer focused on invention, but on the production process; (ii). it's the same 
product that is proposed to the same consumers, but less expensive; (iii). it destroys jobs, 
but frees up capital (reduces stock and total payroll). 
The big difference that separates innovation financing in the 1980s from what we have observed 
since the beginning of the current decade is that in the 1980s, the capital freed up in Phase 3 was 
attributed to financing new research to invent new products or innovations to improve existing 
products, whereas today, due to the financialization of the economy, financial shareholders (i.e. 
investment funds) are substituted for industrial shareholders, which leads to the apparition of new 
ratios (particularly the famous "return on investment"). Capital is most often reinvested in what can 
generate still more capital for shareholders. 
These considerations must finally take into account a product's lifecycle, as described by Anderson 
and Tushman (Figure 4), where each technology cycle beginsning with technology’s discontinuity 
such as a disruptive innovation. This discontinuity is followed by a period of fermentation during 
which rivalry and competition among variations of the original discontinuity eventually leads to a 
single dominant design. The dominant design becomes the industry standard. Thereafter it is an era 
of incremental (evolutionary or ‘nuts and bolts’) technologies. Once this is over, the cycle begins 
again with a further technological discontinuity. 
 
Figure 4. Technology Cycle proposed by Anderson and Rushman (1990) 
It is on the basis of the above considerations that we have sought to build an analysis model that 
enables us to take into account not only all of the information contained in the specialized literature 
(see the bibliography below), but more particularly that, which is specific to the space industry 
sector.  
3. Analysis model. Our conceptual model identifies six criteria: 
- New entrants must be identified in space industry; 
- Satellite miniaturization must meet the conditions of a disruptive innovation; 
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- A complementary innovation (‘complementor’) must appear to boost satellite 
miniaturization as a disruptive innovation; 
- A path dependency must be observed in the existing firms (Innovator’s Dilemma); 
- Existing firms must implement open innovations; 
- New entrants must in turn practice open innovation. 
Some aspects of the conceptual model described above require additional explanation.  
The considerations relative to defining a disruptive innovation were covered in the above exposition.  
On the other hand, it is useful to return to other aspects that make it possible to better define the 
pertinence of the suggested model. 
To begin with, we will address the "complementor" concept.  
(a). Complementor 
Most disruptive innovations do not succeed in isolation and need complementary innovations to 
attract customers3. These complementary products are innovations on the part of other actors, 
which; put the focal firm within an ecosystem of interdependent innovations.  
For example: the Apple’s iPod. Apple has created some complementary products for the iPod that 
increase the value of the iPod, such as specialized accessories and iTunes software. Those specialized 
accessories are speaker systems, car connectors, etc. Apple’s most important complementary asset 
is the iTunes software to encode the content (MP3 from the PC, consumers’ CD collections) for 
iPod’s use.  
The focal firm may itself develop the complementary innovations as Apple did for the iPod. Another 
solution is to develop various types of relationships with value-chain actors. In the case of the iPod, 
these actors developed the specialized accessories for the Apple music player. In their paper, 
Nalebuff and Brandenburger4 conceptualize these different types of relationships and call it them 
the ‘Vvalue Nnet’ (Figure 5). They show how the business game includes customers, suppliers, 
competitors and … complementors. These organizations form part of a Vvalue Nnet with integral 
dependencies.  
                                                             
3
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Figure 5. Value Net 
(b). Path Dependency 
Yu and Hang5 cite that the entrant firms have a better chance of success in disruptive innovation 
compared with existing firms because of their smaller sizes, shorter histories and more limited 
commitments to value networks and current technological paradigms. In other words, existing firms 
are more hampered in developing a disruptive innovation because they have a longer history and 
more commitments to the current technology. This is explained by the path dependency theory.  
The concept of path dependency suggests that technological change follows an established 
trajectory of sustaining innovation and evolutionary. Technological trajectories provide a path 
whereby firms innovate within a specific technology in an attempt to improve the functional 
performance of a technology6. Furthermore, as Dosi mentioned “[tT]echnological paradigms have a 
powerful exclusion effect: the efforts and the technological imagination of engineers and of the 
organizations they are in… are focused in rather precise directions while they are, so to speak, blind 
with respect to other technological possibilities”. Path dependency’s main argument is that “history 
matters”; that historic events in the past determine future paths.  
Path dependency could imply inefficiencies that may persist for extended periods of time, as 
explained by several papers in the 1980s (Paul David7 and Brian Arthur8). See, for instance, the 
demonstration of Paul David on the domination of the QWERTY/AZERTY keyboard layout. The 
locked-in state can be the most efficient solution for them9.  
Rather than treat the process of lock-in as a random event or historical accident, several papers note 
the role of entrepreneurs and existing firms in shaping and interacting with their environments. This 
is explained by the path creation, where the new technologies and production processes that win 
out in the marketplace reflect the dynamic interplay of producers, consumers, and regulators, and 
are not guided by efficiency-minded hands, be they visible or invisible. Path creation stories highlight 
                                                             
5
 (Yu and Hang 2009) 
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the active role of entrepreneurs and existing firms, for it is these actors that help shape the 
evolution of markets and the rules by which markets operate10. 
For instance,: when entrepreneurs favor the emergence of complementary innovations, they also 
reinforce their own path dependency. There is also plenty of evidence that the technological 
changes are influenced by national institutional setting11. While the cumulative nature of techno-
organizational development narrows down the range of potential choices, national paths increase 
differentiation and diversification as offshoots from the main development path12.  
Inferior technologies have become locked- in as industry standards because groups of firms or 
particular firms have interacted with their buyers, suppliers, and regulators to enable them to 
standardize what may have been and continues to be a substandard product or technology. 
(c). Open innovation 
Researchers found that open innovation strategy may be applied to managing disruptive 
innovation13. Open innovation can be employed as a way to monitor potentially disruptive 
technologies that may threaten existing business14. If the existing firms do not perform sufficient 
open innovation, the threat of new entrants is higher.  
Open innovation strategy could be employed to accelerate the development of existing products or 
a new set of products or solutions. Moreover, open innovation can leverage intellectual resources 
from disruptive technology providers to gain new insights on how these technologies may be applied 
to meet their goals. The open innovation firms would scan the market thoroughly and develop 
flexible strategy to exploit new growth opportunity including cooperation or acquisition of disruptive 
firms. The open innovation firms can also identify and spin-in new technologies and innovation 
outside of their firms’ boundaries, cooperate with suppliers and competitors, involve customers into 
the innovation process, and drive out-licensing of their own technologies to create new growth 
opportunities15.  
Henry Chesbrough, in his book “Open Innovation”, suggests that many innovative firms have shifted 
to an open innovation model, using a wide range of external actors and sources to help them 
achieve and sustain innovation. A central part of the innovation process involves the search for new 
ideas that have commercial potential. Firms often invest considerable amounts of time, money and 
other resources in searching for new and innovative opportunities. Such investment increases the 
ability to create, use, and recombine new and existing knowledge. 
                                                             
10
 (Peteraf and Bergen 2003) 
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The open innovation strategy is quite a new view as opposed to the closed innovation concept that 
prevailed during most of the 20th century. In a closed innovation concept, firms attained competitive 
advantage by funding large research laboratories that developed technologies to produce high 
margin products that was injected back into research. The view of closed innovation (Figure 6) is that 
successful innovation requires control. In particular, a firm should control the generation of their 
own ideas, as well as production, marketing, distribution, servicing, financing and support. 
 
Figure 6. Closed Innovation 
 
Figure 7. Open Innovation 
Open Innovation (Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.Figure 2-7) is the use of purposive inflows 
and outflows of knowledge to accelerate innovation. With knowledge now widely distributed, 
companies cannot rely entirely on their own research, but should acquire inventions or intellectual 
property from other companies when it advances the business model. 
As mentioned by Chesbrough, there are two facets of open innovation. The first and the most 
common one is called outside-in, where external ideas and technologies are brought into the firm’s 
own innovation process. Some ways to get innovation from outside: 
1. Leverage other industries; 
2. Acquisition/spin-in: to acquire new technology; 
3. Licensing-in: to buy a patent license; 
4. Crowd-sourcing/open-sourcing: outsource activity to the crowd; 
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5. Collaboration with others; 
6. Innovation through communities/users: rely on communities/lead users; e.g. hosted payload. 
The second facet to innovate is called inside-out where un-utilized and under-utilized ideas and 
technologies in the firm are allowed to go outside to be incorporated into others’ innovation 
processes, for example: 
1. Divestment/spin-out: to pursue outside the technology developed inside; 
2. Licensing-out: to grant a patent license. 
The open innovation strategy is naturally implemented by new entrants. When new entrants had 
activities in a previous industry and enter in a new industry, they implement a sort of inside-in 
strategy when enter in a new industry. They need to incorporate the knowledge required to survive 
in the new industry into their existing knowledge. The strategy of Apple in the smartphones industry 
is an illustration. When new entrants do not exist before their entry, in order to survive they need to 
get new knowledge by all possible sources, including the external ones. Put differently, new entrants 
display by nature high absorption capacities required for open innovation strategy. 
Smaller firms are much more entrepreneurial and innovation-driven whereas larger firms are more 
linear in their behavior, heeding antitrust considerations, established customer relations and 
industry norms that significantly limit their ability to be proactive and instigate change, unlike their 
small competitors16. ; Tthis view was based on research done in the space sector onf the role of 
technological innovation dynamics for small and large firms. 
However, that is not always the case with existing firms. Some display high absorption capacities and 
implement open innovation strategy. However, path dependency mechanisms led other existing 
firms to display lower absorption capacities. These firms do not implement open innovation strategy 
and favor a more traditional innovation strategy.  
4. Discussion.  
(a). Are there new entrants in space industry?  
The response is evidently positive, as the below tableFigure 8 below shows.  
Firms Location/HQ Year 
Founded 
Main Product Main Application 
SSTL UK 1985 Small 
satellite 
EO, Navigation, 
Telecom-
munication, 
Research 
Satrec 
Initiative 
Korea 1999 Small 
satellite 
Earth 
Observation 
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Deimos 
Space 
Spain 2001 Small 
satellite 
Earth 
Observation 
GeoOptics California 
(USA) 
2006 24 small 
satellite 
constellation 
Environmental, 
Weather 
Monitoring 
Gomspace Denmark 2007 Nano and 
cube satellite 
Research, Low-
Cost Science 
Clyde 
Space 
Scotland 2008 Nano and 
cube satellite 
Research 
Skybox 
Imaging 
California 
(USA) 
2009 24-satellite 
constellation 
Earth 
Observation 
NovaNano France 2009 Nano satellite Earth 
Observation 
Planet 
Labs 
California 
(USA) 
2010 100 cubesat 
constellations 
Earth 
Observation 
TyvakNano 
Satellite 
System 
California 
(USA) 
2011 Nano and 
cube 
satellites 
Scientific Mission 
Novawurks California 
(USA) 
2011 Hyper-
integrated 
satellite 
Space 
Exploration 
Dauria 
Aerospace 
German, 
Russia 
2011 Small 
satellite 
EO, 
Communication, 
Navigation 
PlanetiQ Maryland 
(USA) 
2012 12-24 small 
satellite 
constel-lation 
Weather 
Monitoring 
Omni-
Earth 
Virginia 
(USA) 
2013 18-small 
satellite 
Earth 
Observation 
 
Figure 8. List of entrants in the space sector since 1985  
(b). Are small satellites a disruptive innovation?  
As stated in the literature review, new entrants can pose a threat to the existing firms if they could 
produce a disruptive innovation. As the common product of the new entrants in space industry is a 
small satellite, our next task is to analyze if the small satellite could be disruptive.  
Small satellites show another way of thinking about doing business in space. Small satellite firms, 
especially new entrants, start from nothing or from a new concept that has not previously been used 
by existing firms. The small satellite community has shown that highly-reliable parts for short 
duration mission are not necessary. Other industries, such as cellphone and computer industries, are 
producing micro technologies that can be useful for small satellites.  
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Small satellites represent a new technology in the space industry. Compared with traditional 
spacecraft, small satellites are from one to two orders of magnitude smaller and less massive, as well 
as simpler and faster in their construction or design. They can be designed, manufactured and 
launched in under less than two years and with total mission costs of a few hundred thousand Euros. 
Small satellites are also more modular than large satellites. Modularity is achieved by accepted and 
utilized standards; or in other words, there is standardization in small satellites. Small satellites can 
be developed and deployed quickly, and this is the key competitive advantage compared with 
traditional large satellites. 
Small satellites, with their miniaturized components, make it possible to reduce costs and enhance 
the capabilities of certain space missions. Though the capabilities of small satellites are traditionally 
more limited than those of larger counterparts, the relatively light mass of small satellites allow for 
drastically reduced launch costs; reduced development times for small satellites also result in the 
use of more modern technology, which can enhance capabilities and mitigate some of the 
compromises made to reduce the system mass. 
One characteristic of a disruptive technology innovation is the initial inferior performance of existing 
products. Small satellites are currently are less reliable and with a shorter lifetime. Micro or small 
satellites have lifetime of 5 years, compared to 15 years of traditional large satellites. Nano and cube 
satellites even have shorter lifetime, ranging from several months to one year.  
The second characteristic of a disruptive innovation is that it is adopted by a market that is currently 
underserved or not served at all. In other words, it serves a market segment that did not exist 
before. The small satellite missions address a different, under-served, still marginal market which is 
much simpler, cheaper and non-competitive in the traditional space market parameters. New 
markets are developing countries, research institutions whichto test complex payloads, and 
commercial industry. Developing countries begin using small satellites with specific simple payloads 
for technology demonstration, internet backhaul, and for fulfilling basic earth observation missions. 
Research institutions need to understand how a constellation of such very small satellites can be 
used to perform complex tasks, including replicating or complementing an advanced mission 
objective. Commercial industry starts to see the small satellite potential to revolutionize commercial 
market in the earth imagery, internet access, and telecommunications. There is a transition of the 
market from an institutional domain to more commercial domain. Recently Google has acquired 
Skybox Imaging as they use lots of satellite images in their commercial applications. They also 
believe that satellite imagery in the future can be an integral part of decision-making for people on 
athe daily basis.  
Small satellites are much cheaper than large, traditional satellites; and this fulfills the third 
characteristic of a disruptive innovation.  
Existing space firms currently ignore these markets due to very low profit margins, which means that 
new entrants can take the business with their unusual business models in the space field, such as 
standardized space-qualified spacecraft components via an online shop to individual customers. 
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Small satellite business for existing firms would be just a distraction and it is usually difficult to find 
an internal sponsor within large firms for the idea of developing a low capability and cheap version 
of the firm’s main product offering. And this is exactly the gap that new entrants and operators are 
able to exploit. 
Taking the above signs into account, recent small satellite activities seem to show most of the main 
characteristics of a potentially disruptive innovation for the space sector: inferior performance, 
under-served market, lower price. Therefore, it is possible to accept the following necessary 
condition “tThere is a disruptive innovation in the industry”.  
(c). Does a ‘complementor’ exist for small satellites?  
Most breakthrough innovations do not succeed in isolation and they need complementary 
innovations or a complementor. In the case of satellites, the very important complementor is the 
launcher as a way to put the a satellite into space. Only ten countries in the world have launch 
capability; but only seven of them have operational launchers17. Putting and launching satellites in 
orbit is still a major and expensive endeavor.  
Even though the technology seems ready for small satellites for increasingly challenging mission, this 
industry is still in nascent phase with one important missing piece, which is dedicated small 
launcher. The effective use of small satellites to fulfill their mission needs depends on the availability 
and costs of launch vehicles. As satellites become smaller and less expensive, so must launch 
vehicles; or launch costs will become disproportionately large. For years, small-satellite developers 
were eager to obtain any ride into space even if that meant traveling as a secondary payload to 
orbits that were far from ideal. As small satellites become more capable and sophisticated, however, 
their orbital requirements and schedule demands grow. Secondary payload leads to important 
drawback, as it does not provide the specificity required for many small satellites which have unique 
orbital and launch-timing requirements, because they have to adapt to the launch calendar of the 
primary payload. More efficient launch vehicle propulsion engines could provide a competitive 
advantage for small payload delivery, therefore enabling the reduction of costs in Low Earth Orbit 
(the “LEO”) satellites deployment by orders of magnitude. Under this scenario, the industry would 
be more competitive than it is today, with lower barriers to entry. All these innovations together 
would most likely bring in a more open, innovative, and competitive space industry than we know 
today. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
17
 (OECD 22 July 2011) 
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Launch Vehicles 
Company 
(Country) 
Capacity to Low 
Earth Orbit 
Taurus OSC (US) 860-945 kg 
Pegasus OSC (US) 450 kg 
Minotaur OSC (US) 1700 kg 
PSLV ISRO (India) 1300 kg 
Shavit IAI (Israel) 340 kg 
Dnepr 
Yushnoye 
(Ukraine) 
3600 kg 
Epsilon 
(not yet 
operational) 
JAXA (Japan) 1200 kg 
Cyclone 
(not yet 
operational) 
Yushnoye 
(Ukraine) 
4000 kg 
 
Figure 9. Launch Vehicles available for Small Satellites 
Figure 9 above shows the list of launch vehicles available for small satellites to go to the Llow -Eearth 
Oorbit. There are not many to begin with and some of them are not available for a commercial 
market. The launch vehicles from Orbital Sciences Corporation (the “OSC”) are mainly used byfor the 
U.S. Ggovernments and institutional satellites. Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (the “PSLV”) from India 
are is also prioritized for Indian domestic use and leave almost no capacity for export to commercial 
market. Dnepr from Ukraine, a launcher based on missile conversion, isare nearly retired since the 
missiles SS-18 are out of production for around 25 years. This view is shared also by some 
interviewees; one says: “If today there is a micro launcher, that is not expensive and available, 
therefore it [the small satellite] is disruptive”. He emphasizes that the two attributes are important: 
cheap and available (for commercial market). On top of that, looking at the payload capacity of 
those launchers, we can see that there is a clear oversupply of payload capacity for small satellites. 
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Hence the small satellites need to sacrifice other attributes, such as orbit selection and launch date, 
to get into orbit.  
Current launch providers seem to be ignoring this trend, even the most entrepreneurial one, SpaceX. 
They have discarded the development of Falcon-1 that could have been suited for small satellite 
launcher. There isn’t any commercially available solution especially designed for small satellites and 
there isn’t any public project from established launchers to serve this segment with a dedicated 
launcher. The structural costs of these players make them perceive this market as unattractive but it 
makes them vulnerable to new entrants willing to disrupt the market18. This opportunity has inspired 
some new entrants to pursue the development of a small satellite launcher. Garvey Spacecraft Corp, 
founded in 2000 in California, U.S., currently is focused on developing a dedicated launch vehicle for 
nano satellites that is designed to deliver 10 kg payloads to the LEOlow Earth orbit. Virgin Galactic, a 
British commercial spaceflight company, is developing LauncherOne to launch up to 200 kg small 
satellite to the Llow -Eearth Oorbit. Another new entrant, created in 2012 in Switzerland, Swiss 
Space System (S3) plans to provide orbital launches of small satellites up to 250 kg. There may be 
some other firms not mentioned here. 
This leads us to reject the necessary condition of having a complementary product to increase the 
perceived value of athe disruptive innovation for potential adopters. 
(d). Is “path dependency” observed in the existing firms?  
Existing space firms are mainly bearing the stamp of a conservative industry that is heavily 
implicated by path dependency. The next part shows the research result on the question whetherif 
existing firms are implicated by the innovation barrier of path dependency.  
Technology innovation is path dependent, with roots in the past that the firms have continued ever 
since. History matters, and space industry is heavily influenced by its history. It began with Sputnik, 
in the early years of the Cold War, when the atmosphere was influenced by political tension 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. For instance, Bruggeman’s paper19 described that 
there was a persistent, path dependent concern that the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (the “NASA”) could not survive politically unless it emphasized human space flight. 
Political victories (perhaps necessarily) were given priority over long-term presence in space. 
Organizations become more rigid and less flexible as they grow and it is often forced by larger 
political system and through formalization of procedures. An additional consequence of 
bureaucratization was the increased risk aversion. For an agency where innovation and risk are 
never far apart, aversion to risk suppresses creativity and lowers confidence. NASA became more 
conservative and less willing to take risks. The people who stayed learned to do the same; those who 
did not or could not learn the new path left.  
                                                             
18
 (Serra, Ars and Solanilla 2013) 
19
 (Bruggeman 2002) 
Mis en forme : Police :Italique
Mis en forme : Police :Italique
Mis en forme : Police :Italique
Mis en forme : Police :Italique
Mis en forme : Police :Italique
Mis en forme : Police :Italique
 
 
 17 
 
Mis en forme : Centré
The United States’ space governmental budget was US$43 billion in 200920. NASA’s budget 
historically represents around 40% of the total space budget (or about US$18 billion), . cCompared 
this with ESA budget of €3.6 billion in 2009 and €3.74 billion in 2010. U.S. isare the leading country in 
the space industry, not only in terms of the budget spent, but also it is one of the first countries with 
space activities. Hence it is fair to say that NASA prints the path to be followed, perhaps 
unconsciously, by other agencies in the world.  
The space industry continues to be largely dominated by governmental programs and decisions. 
Until now, it has been obvious that the space industry does not have a market structure based on 
full competitive free markets dominated by private firms; instead it is largely influenced by 
governments following their investments, objectives, and priorities. This is confirmed by interviews 
when discussing the budget for R&D: “The money needs to come from somewhere, and that’s from a 
government”. This situation induces a lack of some innovation- stimulating effects.  
Space activities are naturally high-risk endeavors and they are also high-risk adverse due to the 
mindset that offers practically no opportunities for error corrections after launch, as confirmed by 
the interview: “By default insurers are conservative. So final customers also tend to be conservative 
and they put high pressure on the industry to be conservative as well”. This has left little freedom for 
innovation not strictly needed for mission success and leads to technically conservative space 
engineers and project managers. While this behavior favors incremental changes at subsystem level 
and thus for sustaining or incremental innovation, it acts as a strong inhibitor against fundamentally 
new approaches related to radical or disruptive innovation.  
Are large existing firms experiencing the innovator’s dilemma? The small satellite market presents 
some key characteristics of a potentially disruptive innovation: they come from and address a 
different, still marginal market; they are much simpler, cheaper and non-competitive in the 
traditional space market parameters. Nevertheless, traditional space firms are by large ignoring the 
market due to very low profit margins. One large existing firm gaives this comment when asked 
about the small satellite business development in his firm: “[sSmall satellites for developing 
countries] it is not a mature market. There is no added value for a big company like us to go on so 
small a product with low added value. We do not consider that this is a market for us”. Another fact: 
only 5 of the almost 200 registered participants at the Second European Cubesat Workshop 
organized by the European Space Agency (the “ESA”) in January 2009 came from the traditional 
European space industry21.  
Large firms adopt a skeptical attitude of “wait and see”. They decide to wait before taking any action 
because they doubt that this new technology would prevail; for example, this comment: “I am still 
waiting to see the business of nano satellites, today I would say it modestly I haven’t yet seen [the 
business plan of nano satellites in terms of capex and ROI]. This nano sat is still an experiment”.  
                                                             
20
 (OECD 22 July 2011) 
21
 (Summerer 2011) 
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Large firms believe that small satellites have inferior performance and are not currently reliable; for 
example, Dove satellites from Planet Labs only lasts several months in space and from 28 satellites 
launched in February 2014, only 9 survived. Then it is complemented by this remark: “Space is a 
hostile environment where the entry barrier is very high. Planet Labs, Skybox, Google don’t know how 
to build satellites with 10 years of lifetime”.  
The large firms also believe that this time around it could be another bubble in the space industry, as 
one says the following “Right now it is obvious there is a bubble in the space industry, for the 
satellites and also for access to space”. The new entrants’ explosion happened before in the 1990s, 
however all finally experienced commercial failure. Teledesic, created in 1990s with early funding 
from Bill Gates (Microsoft), was designed for commercial broadband satellite constellation and went 
into Chapter 11 in 2002. Iridium with back-up from Motorola was founded in 1991 to operate 66 
satellite constellations for communication but went bankrupt in 1999. Globalstar (with Loral and 
Qualcomm) and Orbcomm (Orbital Sciences) were founded in 1991 for satellite phones, but they 
went bankrupt in 2002 and 2000 respectively.  
The interview result above allows us to accept the necessary condition that the large existing firms 
are implicated by the path dependency.  
(e). Do existing firms employ open innovation? 
Traditionally, conducting space technology development and launching space missions required 
massive infrastructure investments, long lead times and large teams of experts. Furthermore, since 
its creation after the Second World War, the space industry has been dominated by government or 
institutions that resulted in a monopsony market. As a consequence, the space sector is a fairly 
closed sector, with few natural exchanges outside of aerospace and defense22.  
Characteristics of open innovation that can be done in space industry: 
 Outside-in: 
o Leverage other industries: agile aerospace (to be done like in the software industry: 
release early and often), analytical platform for big data (from the Internet), use 
smartphone flash memory, simplify testing (not typically done in traditional space 
industry); 
o Using COTS: not space-proven components or ready-to-buy components (without 
specific contracts or specification); 
o Acquisition/spin-in: acquire new technology; 
o Licensing-in: buy a patent license; 
o Crowd-sourcing/open-sourcing: outsource activity to the crowd; 
o Collaboration with others; 
o Innovation through communities/users: rely on communities/lead users; e.g. hosted 
payload. 
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 Inside-out: 
o Divestment/spin-out: pursue externally the technology developed internally; 
o Licensing-out: grant a patent license. 
Large, existing firms in the industry state that they perform collaborative innovation and look out for 
ideas from universities/engineering schools, new entrants, competitors, conferences, suppliers, or 
subcontractors. One comment: “We are looking for any sources to monitor trends which will allow us 
to match better the market evolution and competition”. One interviewee explained how their 
company approached other company outside of space industry to collaborate. Boostec, ceramics 
specialist based in Tarbes, is a manufacturer of the terrestrial industry application. In the 1990s it 
was contacted by Airbus Defense and Space (then Astrium/Matra Marconi Space) that said that their 
silicon carbide held promise for space optics. Their decades-long collaboration led to a production of 
a state-of-the-art reflector that is currently flying on the Herschel and Gaia satellites. One large firm 
also confirms “I think both commercially and technically we are innovative, maybe it is fast enough 
[to follow market evolution]”.  
They agree that COTS components will be used more and more in the future, mostly for LEOlow-
earth orbit satellites: “In the future we will have more and more COTS on board. We have Samsung 
flash memory in our LEO satellite now”. It is difficult to use COTS components for geostationary 
telecommunication satellites because the telecommunication market is more competitive and 
sensitive to reliability (1-minute loss of broadcast is a disaster, especially if it is during very important 
event). In a way, low-earth orbitLEO satellites are more adapted to innovation because the 
application is less demanding (they can lose 5-minute of coverage without significant impact) and 
also because their customers are less experienced. One existing firm mentioned that they employ 
COTS components in their Iridium satellites. This is feasible because Iridium is a constellation and the 
reliability in a constellation is measured by the whole system and not by individual satellite. 
Looking at the characteristics above and the interview result, we reject the following necessary 
condition: the existing firms do not implement open innovation.  
 (f). Do new entrants practice open innovation? 
New entrants fundamentally work in a different way compared to existing firms. Smaller teams, 
significant use of commercial off- the- shelf technologies, crowdfunding, a more aggressive approach 
to managing risk and a great motivation to leverage intellectual property or other industries are just 
some of the defining characteristics of open innovation.  
The interviews with small/medium firms (though not all of them are new entrants) support the idea 
of these firms implementing open innovation. All of them look for outside ideas and technologies 
and collaborate with other firms, even with firms outside of the space industry. There is one firm 
that was not originally involved in space (they was started their business in TV broadcast), so this 
firm naturally is already open to innovation because they leverage other industry for the space 
component they produce. Also, there is one technology research firm whose business is to do 
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technology research in different fields (energy & environment, defense & security, information 
technology, ergonomics, and aerospace & transport). 
Regarding the COTS usage, the small firms interviewed stated that they always try to use COTS 
components as much as possible; however often they are prevented to use it because the mission 
and main customers’ requirement ask for high reliable components, so therefore COTS cannot be 
optimally used. This confirms the fact of monopsony market makes the space industry less 
innovative. 
We therefore accept the following necessary condition: new entrants implement open innovation.  
5. Results.  
Our assumption is as follows: there is a threat of new entrants to existing space industry firms if the 
following necessary conditions display a high level of probability.  
The levels obtained are summarized in the Figure below:  
No Necessary Conditions Status 
i There are new entrants Accepted 
ii 
Small satellite is a disruptive 
innovation in space industry 
Accepted 
iii 
There is a complementary product to 
complete the disruptive innovation 
Rejected 
iv 
The existing firms are implicated with 
path dependency 
Accepted 
v 
The existing firms do not implement 
open innovation 
Rejected 
vi 
The new entrants implement open 
innovation. 
Accepted 
 
 
Based on our results it seems too early to tell if these new entrants will be successful and small 
satellites will disrupt the space industry. Our results prevent giving one single answer to our research 
question because all of these developments are still happening now. We propose two possible 
scenarios that could take place in the future.  
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The first scenario is the ‘Kodak Scenario23’ for the existing firms. This scenario is considered because 
the following necessary conditions prevail: 
(i) There are new entrants;. 
(ii) Small satellite is a disruptive innovation in space industry;. 
(iii)  
(iv)(ii)  
(v)(iii) Existing firms are implicated with path dependency;. 
(vi)(iv) New entrants implement open innovation. 
New entrants are showing up recently, out of the need to fill a market-need in a segment that was 
either overlooked or ignored by existing firms. Furthermore, these small satellite providers are 
beginning to propose their new business models to win business that would traditionally have been 
considered the domain of large, well-capitalized players.  
The small satellites have boosted their performance and sustained their innovation to a high level. 
Taking all the symptomsindicators into account (simpler and lower performance, under-served 
market, and cheaper), recent small satellite activities seem to show most of the main characteristics 
of a potentially disruptive, radical innovation for the space sector.  
The result has also shown that the path dependency and the innovator’s dilemma behaviors 
observed in the existing firms. For example,: the “wait -and -see” attitude for the small satellites; the 
comment that small satellite is not a mature market and therefore it is not a market for them; and 
also the comment that what is happening now for surecertainly is a bubble.  
Under the assumption that the mechanisms observed and studied in fully competitive free markets 
are applicable to the space industry, traditional existing firms might need to take these 
developments seriously and deploy proactive strategies to include these fully into their planning and 
future business scenarios. 
During the discussion at 18th Annual Conference on Small Satellites sponsored by AIAA in August 
2004, while agreeing that microsatellites were certainly disruptive, Martin Sweeting from SSTL 
stated that if the concept of disruptive means totally wiping away everything that went previously 
and replacing it with something new, it was probably going a bit far for small satellites. The analysis 
shows that while small satellites do enable valuable missions, they represent only a small part of the 
overall space market. It would be interesting though however to see his opinion now, ten years later, 
because the small satellites seem to claw their existence deeper in the industry.  
Yu and Hang24 mention that disruptive innovation does not always imply that entrants or emerging 
business will replace the existing firms or traditional business. In fact, an incumbent business with 
                                                             
23
 Kodak, a market leader in the film business in the 20
th
 century failed to respond to changes in technology, 
choosing not to move into digital photography and consequently, letting others dominate the digital 
photography field 
24 (Yu and Hang 2009) 
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existing high-end technologies can still survive by concentrating on how to satisfy its most 
demanding but least price- sensitive customers. 
The second scenario (‘bubble scenario’) is that we may be heading for another ‘space bubble ’. 
Bubble, or it is known as well as boom-and-bust cycle, is a reference to a severe business cycle; a 
time period where business activity increases very rapidly (for example, a lot of new entrants show 
up) followed by sharp and rapid contraction. In the 1990s, the satellite industry went through a 
‘space bubble’ when investors projected that phones connected via constellations of satellites would 
be the immediate future of mobile communications. But the growth of terrestrial cellular networks 
left few customers for satellite phones, and several years later the market collapsed. However, 
Iridium case study shows that their main flaw is the escalating commitment from the top 
management who kept pushing Iridium forward in spite of deeply flawed business plan. Moreover, 
at that time, the technology needed was not mature at all, whereas currently in its second time 
around, it seems they have matured the technology and Iridium’s business case is more robust.  
This scenario is considered because the following necessary conditions are have prevailed: 
(iii) There is no complementary product to complete the disruptive innovation; 
(iv) Existing firms implement open innovation. 
It has been acknowledged that the lack of affordable and timely access to orbit is the most 
prominent barrier to small satellite adoption. It could be easily implied that cost-effective 
development in launching technologies, which will enable dedicated launches for small satellites 
with the use of small rockets, would greatly increase the adoption of small satellites for the purpose 
they serve today. This breakthrough could potentially reduce launch costs in a very significant way to 
increase launch opportunities, reduce the need for safety and increase the rate of innovation in the 
satellite industry. A dedicated launcher for small satellites would tackle these problems enhancing 
the mission capabilities of small satellites. Without it, the small satellite would not be a disruptive 
innovation in the space industry. 
Existing firms employ an open innovation strategy. They monitor the market systematically to 
identify the new technology in the industry. They also collaborate with new entrants, other 
companies, etc. This open innovation effort would reduce the threat posed by new entrants. 
Problematic and persistent behavior in the space industry of thinking of engineering first and of the 
customers second could be a reason for another bubble. This industry is a ‘technology push’ and is 
known to push the solution onto a market that does not quite yet exist. Furthermore, it is often 
observed that small satellites cannot ultimately replace large complex satellites, simply because the 
laws of physics do not permit that. They have a natural limitation in the size, complexity, and mass of 
the payload that they can carry. 
Nevertheless, this bubble may be regarded as the start of a new technology cycle in the space 
industry. A new cycle starts with a discontinuous innovation and is followed by ‘nuts -and -bolts’ 
innovations. Most of these innovations fail (for example, the ‘bubble’ in the 1990s); however 
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progressively a variation of the first discontinuous innovation has emerged that will become the 
standard in the future. This process may last several years, or several decades. Put differently, we 
may say that the time for small satellites will come one day; we just do not know when. Lastly, 
should this prove to be a bubble, the existing state of affairs will dictate the future.  
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